Semi-random Notes on Ukraine 

1. If the attempt to take Hostomel airport and fly additional forces in had succeeded those predictions of a rapid Ukrainian collapse might have been correct.

2. That convoy that sat on the road outside Kiev for abut two week was a resupply convoy - lots of trucks, minimal tanks and artillery. It was supposed to link up with and resupply the forces landing at Hostomel. The reason the Ukrainians made minimal attempts to attack it was that it effectively blocked the highway, denying it to other Russian units. By now, the food and fuel they were supposed to be delivering has probably been exhausted feeding the convoy itself. Admittedly that still leaves ammo, spare parts etc.

3. The key difference between Putin's regime and, say, Kruschchev's is that the Politburo had the power to remove Kruschchev and they'd all risen to the top based, at least in part, on their own ability. I hate to keep using the H-word, but Putin is more like Hitler in that his regime is intensely personal and senior figures are there because of personal connections to Putin himself. His former chef and his former driver both mysteriously made billions and now serve in senior if unofficial roles.

4. Russian casualties: whether the actual Russian fatalities are 10,000 or 15,000 is kind of irrelevant for the purposes of assessing how the war is progressing. (Obviously it's a massive and wholly unnecessary human tragedy.)

That may seem odd but consider this: wounded typically exceed fatalities by at least 2:1 and more often 3:1 or 4:1. Thanks to advances in battlefield medical treatment and extensive use of medevac helicopters, the US in Iraq got that up to 10:1. So let's assume the figure of approximately 10,000 Russian casualties is correct - that's the NATO estimate and very close to the figure published by a Russian pro-Putin paper and then redacted. That would imply, conservatively, an additional 20-30,000 wounded. Then add in captured, deserted and other MIA (like soldiers who get separated from their units and are just wandering around). Let's say 10,000.

So total all-up casualties are probably between 40 and 50,000. If we round up initial Russian troop numbers to 200,000 that's between 20 and 25%. Many individual units would be well above that and effectively no longer capable of offensive action. Now officially Russia has 1,000,000 troops and another 1,000,000 reservists but most of them are conscripts and according to Russian law (for what that's worth under Putin) conscripts can't be sent abroad to fight. Also, a good part of the contract soldier component are in stuff like the Special Rocket Forces (the Russian nuclear deterrent) or in essential noncombat roles like, say, aircraft ground maintenance or logistics or medical services. Plus, of course, they have to maintain SOME forces elsewhere. They can't just leave Kaliningrad and the southern Kuriles (to name two examples) completely undefended and if things suddenly escalate those 30,000 NATO troops on exercises in Norway really could be in St Petersburg in 2-3 days.

So that 200,000 forces probably does represent their entire useable offensive force. There are very few replacements available.

Next: rotation. For troops in high-level combat tours of duty are typically 6-12 months but if we look at US forces in Afghanistan for example, front line combat duty usually lasted no more than 2-4 weeks, then other duties for 2-4 weeks then back to combat. Russian doctrine incorporates "the 72 hour surge" and "the strategic pause". The 72 hour surge is pretty self-explanatory, Russian units are expected to be capable of high-intensity offensive operations for three days with minimal sleep or rest or time spent on other duties like maintenance. The theory is most other militaries can't match that pace and will be overwhelmed. (This may also be where "We'll take Kyiv in 3 days" came from.) Then there's a pause of 3-7 days while troops recover; replacement troops and additional supplies arrive and equipment is repaired. Then the cycle is repeated. One of the implications of this is that Russian units typically only carry enough supplies for three days with minimal additional reserves - which is why losing resupply trucks is such a problem. Within Russia itself, the assumption is that Russia's train network, the largest in the world, will do most of the resupply task. That doesn't work when you're in another country and the defenders are blowing up railway bridges as they retreat.

So the Russian units in Ukraine in many cases have been through a month of high intensity combat with few breaks. You don't need to subscribe to the newfound contempt for all things Russian to recognize that any modern military's combat capability will degrade under those circumstances.